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Cost Sharing in Higher Education: Tuition, Financial Assistance, 
and Accessibility in a Comparative Perspective
D. BRUCE JOHNSTONE*
State University of New York at Buffalo
Abstract: Cost sharing in higher education is the assumption by parents and
students of a portion of the costs of higher education – costs that in many na-
tions, at least until recently, have been borne predominantly or even exclusively
by governments, or taxpayers. The author presents empirical evidence of, and
various theoretical justifications for, increasing cost sharing throughout the
world in the forms of tuitions and fees, the diminishing real value of student
maintenance grants, and an increasing reliance on private forms of higher
education. Resistance to cost sharing, both ideological and strategic, is also
analysed. The author discusses policy alternatives such as grants versus loans
and the criteria for an appropriate tuition level, as well as the impact of cost shar-
ing on enrolment behaviour. He concludes that increased cost sharing is proba-
bly inevitable, less on the basis of the classical neoliberal economic claim for
greater equity and efficiency than on the basis of the sheer need for revenue and
the increasing priority of alternative claims on public treasuries. 
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Cost sharing in higher education refers to a shift in the burden of higher education
costs from being borne exclusively or predominately by government, or taxpayers,
to being shared with parents and students. This cost sharing, as articulated in
Johnstone [1986, 1992, 1993b, 2002, 2003], may take the form of tuition, either be-
ing introduced where it did not hitherto exist or being rapidly increased where it al-
ready did, or of public institutions charging more nearly break-even, or full, cost fees
for room, board, books, and other costs of student living that may formerly have
been covered mainly by the government. A shift of the cost burden from the gov-
ernment to student and family may also come in the form of a reduction or even a
freezing (especially in inflationary times) of student grants. Similarly, it may come in
the form of a reduction of the effective grants represented by student loan subsidies,
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as interest rates are increased to become closer to the costs of money or market
rates. Finally, the shift may come about through public policies that shift enrol-
ments, particularly in rapidly expanding systems, from a heavily subsidised public
sector to a much less subsidised, tuition-dependent private sector.1
In all these ways, and in combinations thereof, albeit unevenly and still ideo-
logically contested, the burden of higher educational costs worldwide is being shift-
ed from governments or taxpayers to students and families.2 Thus, we can observe
cost sharing entering into the public policies of countries with totally different so-
cial-political-economic systems and at totally different stages in their expansion of
higher educational participation: e.g. China, Vietnam, the UK and Austria.
In light of this shift, this article explores five questions:
1. What are the theoretical and practical rationales for shifting some portion
of the higher educational cost burden from governments and taxpayers to students
and families?
2. What are the theoretical, political, ideological, practical, and/or strategic
bases for resistance to this shift?
3. What is the impact of increasing cost burdens (mainly tuition and related
fees) on student enrolment behaviour – that is, enrolment, persistence to a degree,
continuation to a higher degree, and the decision of where or in what kind of high-
er educational institution to enrol? (In this connection, we will be particularly inter-
ested in whether enrolments might be dampened for those whose access is already
compromised by (a) low income; (b) racial, ethnic, religious, or linguistic status; (c)
gender (most often ‘being female’); or (d) isolation – especially from good secondary
schools and the cultural enrichment generally associated with urban areas, as well
as from institutions of higher education close enough to allow living at home).
4. What is the higher education cost (or more properly expenditure) burden cur-
rently being borne by the student and family in various countries, and what is the
recent increase in these costs borne by students and families as opposed to govern-
ments or taxpayers? (This question must consider any offsetting effects of means-
tested or otherwise targeted grants and student loans).
5. What policy tools – e.g. need-based grants, loans, loan subsidies, very low
or no tuition, subsidised lodging and food – are being employed to increase acces-
sibility, and what is known of their efficacy?
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1 For an extensive collection of papers and studies on cost sharing, see International Com-
parative Higher Education Finance and Accessibility Project: http://www.gse.buffalo.edu/org/Int
HigherEdFinance.
2 ‘Taxpayers’ includes the general citizen/consumer losing purchasing power to the govern-
ment via the higher prices brought on by hidden business taxes or through inflation brought
about by public deficit financing.
Rationale for cost sharing
The principal causes for or rationales behind this shift are three, and they differ con-
siderably in their underlying economic, political, and ideological assumptions. The
first rationale is the sheer need for other than governmental revenue. This need be-
gins with the dramatic increase in most countries in both the public and private de-
mand for higher education, recognised as a major engine of national economic
growth and a provider of individual opportunity and prosperity. This demand pres-
sure is a function of the sheer demographic increase in the traditional college-age
cohort, compounded by the increasing secondary school completion rates, which in
turn increases the number of those wanting to go on to higher education, further
compounded by an expansion of what may be considered a college-going age cohort
to include adults formerly by-passed by the system. This demand pressure is espe-
cially felt in low income countries that are still trying to change from ‘elite’ to ‘mass’
tertiary-level participation, at the same time as they are trying to become more eco-
nomically competitive in an increasingly global economy. But the increase in de-
mand for higher education can also be found in countries already at mass or even
near-universal participation rates, as the average student ‘consumes’ ever increasing
amounts of higher or (at least post-secondary) education over his or her lifetime.
However, the institutions delivering higher education are nearly everywhere –
and especially in most developing or low-income countries and in those countries in
transition from command to market-driven economies – also suffering from a severe
and worsening austerity. This austerity is a function of at least three forces. The first
is the demand pressure, mentioned just above. The second is the high – and likely
to increase – per-student costs on top of the increasing numbers of students.3 Per-
student costs in higher education generally rise faster than unit costs in the general
economy owing to the traditional resistance on the part of academia (institutions
and faculty alike) to measures that would increase productivity by substituting cap-
ital for labour or by shedding existing, but lower priority, programmes and their as-
sociated labour costs.4
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3 Specifying (not to mention making international comparisons between) per-student, first-
degree, instructional costs is oftentimes unreliable for several reasons including: (1) the dif-
ficulty of attributing costs to first degree instruction as opposed, say, to the costs of research
or service or advanced instruction; (2) great variability in the accounting treatment of pen-
sion and other so-called benefits expenses, in addition to direct salary costs; and (3) a simi-
lar variability in the treatment of capital costs within most of the published international da-
ta on the comparative costs of higher education.
4 The resistance to productivity or efficiency is pervasive in the classical university in most
countries, although a kind of ‘efficiency’ is being forced upon many universities in the forms
of mandatory enrolment increases, cuts in faculty numbers, and freezes or even reductions
in faculty salaries. The more purposeful enhancement to higher educational productivity –
e.g. through the application of instructional technology, or the radical restructuring of in-
structional styles and faculty workloads – are more likely in entirely new institutions and sec-
tors (such as ‘distance learning universities’), but it may be debated whether these forms are
genuinely ‘more productive’ or are better described as ‘different albeit cheaper’. 
A third cause of increased austerity, especially in the low income and ‘transi-
tional’ countries, is the decline in available public (taxpayer-based) revenue. This de-
cline, in turn, may be a function either (or both) of an increased difficulty of taxa-
tion, or of competition from other, oftentimes more politically compelling, public
needs. For example, taxes were relatively easy to collect in centrally controlled
economies such as the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe before the collapse
of communism, where purchasing power could be siphoned off at each level of the
state-owned production processes via ‘turnover’, or other forms of value-added tax-
es. The state could also control – and thus tax – all international trade. Privatisation
and globalisation have essentially eliminated these largely invisible and easy-to-col-
lect taxes, and the alternatives – e.g. taxes on income, retail sales, property, and the
sales of luxury goods – are visible, unpopular, expensive, relatively easy to avoid,
and technically (in addition to politically) difficult to collect. Furthermore, for the
limited taxes that can be collected (or the limited deficit financing that the economy
can tolerate), higher education increasingly has a lower priority than other public
sector needs such as elementary and secondary education, public health, housing
and public infrastructure, welfare and the social and economic ‘safety net’, and in-
ternal and external security.
It is in light of these forces and the consequent financial struggles that na-
tional systems of higher education and institutions nearly everywhere in the world
are having to supplement their governmental revenues, not only with ‘cost sharing’,
as noted above, but also with entrepreneurial activities such as the sale of faculty
services, the sale or lease of university facilities, the vigorous pursuit of grants and
contracts, and fund raising from alumni, corporations, and friends. Thus, tuition
and other fees from students and families have the potential for substantially aug-
menting the increasingly scarce public revenues. Tuition also has the advantage of
doing so without simultaneously adding new costs or diverting faculty from their
core teaching responsibilities (as is the case with supplementing revenues via grants
and contracts or other forms of faculty entrepreneurship). 
The objection that imposing tuition or increasing it at a rapid rate might ex-
clude potential students from poor or rural or otherwise disadvantaged families can
be met, it is argued, by the promise of generally available loans (i.e. loans that do
not depend on the creditworthiness – and thus the financial worth – of the family),
or by means-tested student grants, paid for, at least in part, by the augmented
tuition revenue. In fact, the proponents of cost sharing are likely to argue that the
alternative to some form of substantial public revenue supplementation is contin-
ued or worsening austerity in the public higher education system, the likely result
of which would be limitations on enrolment and/or increasingly shabby and under-
funded universities. And because the sons and daughters of the wealthy will always
have alternatives (in the private sector or higher education abroad), the students, or
potential students, who will be hurt most are the very disadvantaged students that
the resistance to tuition is supposed to protect.
The second rationale for tuition and other forms of cost sharing, based less on
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2003, Vol. 39, No. 3
354
need or expediency than on principle (however ideologically contested), is the no-
tion of equity: the view that those who benefit should at least share in the costs. The
principle is made more vivid and compelling by four observations. The first is that
‘free’ higher education is actually paid for by all citizens, whether or not they know
that they have been taxed (or have had their purchasing power effectively confis-
cated by inflation brought on by the printing of money). Second, most taxes – pub-
lic policies to the contrary notwithstanding – are collected through regressive, or at
best proportional, taxes on sales, production, or individual incomes that cannot be
otherwise hidden (or through the even more regressive governmentally-induced in-
flation, as mentioned above). Third, a very disproportionate number of the benefi-
ciaries of higher education are from middle, upper middle, and upper income fam-
ilies who could and would pay at least a portion of the costs of instruction if they
had to – thus demonstrating the value to them of the higher educational opportuni-
ty and signalling the benefits that are thought to be private as opposed to public.
Such students and families would probably prefer that much or all of this particu-
lar benefit be paid for by the general taxpayer. But whether higher education is sub-
sidised or not – that is, whether tuition is zero, moderate, or high – should make lit-
tle or no difference in the enrolment behaviour of the students from more affluent
families. In this instance, the higher public subsidy required by low or no tuition can
be said (at least by the proponents of ‘cost sharing’) to resemble a transfer payment
from the public treasury to middle and upper middle class families. Fourth and fi-
nally, to the extent that there are potential students who would be excluded from
higher education by the presence of tuition, a portion of the tuition collected can
easily (at least in theory) fund the means-tested grants and loan subsidies that can
(again, at least in theory) maintain and even enhance accessibility.5
A third rationale for cost sharing in higher education is the neoliberal econom-
ic notion that tuition – a price, as it were, on a valuable and highly demanded com-
modity – brings to higher education some of the virtues of the market. The first such
virtue is the presumption of greater efficiency: that the payment of some tuition will
make students and families more discerning consumers and the universities more
cost-conscious providers. The second virtue attributed to the market is producer re-
sponsiveness: the assumption that the need to supplement public revenue with tu-
ition, gifts, and grants will make universities more responsive to individual and so-
cietal needs. A variation on this theme is directed at the alleged problem of academ-
D. Bruce Johnstone: Cost Sharing in Higher Education: Tuition, Financial Assistance, and Accessibility
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5 Some classic expositions of this equity argument include W. L. Hansen and B. A. Weisbrod,
Benefits, Costs, and Finance of Higher Education (Chicago: Markham Publishing, 1969); Carnegie
Commission on Higher Education, Higher Education: Who Pays? Who Benefits? Who Should
Pay? (New York: the McGraw Hill Book Co., 1973); J. P. Jallade, “Financing Higher Education:
The Equity Aspects,” Comparative Education Review, June 1978, pp. 309–325; and G. Psacha-
ropoulos and M. Woodhall, Education for Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press for
The World Bank, 1985); and J. C. Hearn, C. P. Griswold, and G. M. Marine, ‘Region, Resources,
and Reason: A Contextual Analysis of State Tuition and Student Aid Policies’, Research in
Higher Education, 37 (3), pp. 241–278.
ic malingering – that is, students alleged to be taking more years or more courses (or
both) than are necessary or even useful merely or largely because the courses and
sometimes even the living expenses are paid for, and because the alternative may be
either unemployment or an unappealing job out in the real world. Germany, the
Netherlands, and the US have responded in part by eliminating or reducing student
aid after insufficient progress toward the degree, and some US states have begun
charging higher, out-of-state tuition after so many ‘excess’ credits.
Resistance to cost sharing
All of this is contested ideological ground, and not all policy makers, observers, or
stakeholders share the notion that increased cost sharing – that is, a further shift of
the cost burden to the student and family – is correct, necessary, or even ‘good ex-
pediency’. The shift in the higher educational cost burden from governments and
taxpayers to students and families may not be easily accepted, especially in coun-
tries with dominant socio-political ideologies that hold higher education to be an-
other social entitlement: to be free, at least for those fortunate enough to make it
through the rigorous academic secondary system. This ideology, in turn, can stem
from a view that society is the major beneficiary of higher education, and that this
observation ought to override the demonstrably high private benefits received by
the graduates and their families. 
This economic rationale provides good theoretical cover to student, parent, and
faculty self-interest in the preservation of low or no tuition. Students, regardless of
ideology, tend (understandably enough) to resist the imposition of, or increase in,
tuition. Students can be a formidable political force, particularly in leftwing and rad-
ical politics, especially in Europe and Latin America and in some countries in Asia.
Also, parents of students and would-be students, especially in low-income countries,
may be politically powerful elites who just happen to benefit most from the free high-
er education. This may explain why many students and families, both affluent and
low-income, and both ‘left’ and ‘right’ often tend to oppose tuition, while most econ-
omists and many political scientists, including those on both the political left and
right, tend to approve at least some degree of ‘cost sharing’. 
In opposition to efficiency and market responsiveness as rationales for greater
cost sharing, many academic leaders assert that a proper higher education is sup-
posed to be removed, or at least substantially insulated, from commercialisation and
market forces. According to many academic traditionalists, slavishly following what
students think they want, or what politicians or business think they want students
to take, is the road to academic mediocrity. Furthermore, there is no evidence, at
least in the US, that academic responsiveness, educational quality, or efficiency im-
proves with higher tuition. However, this traditionalist position is increasingly
viewed by governments and many citizens as academically self-serving, as well as
costly to the taxpayer.
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The view that higher education ought to be ‘free’ or at least very highly sub-
sidised may also be mainly pragmatic and strategic, regardless of ideology or poli-
tics. For example, many opponents to the view of cost sharing, as presented above,
accept the notion that means-tested financial assistance and loans might in theory
preserve accessibility in the face of rising tuition and diminishing taxpayer subsi-
dies to the ‘well-off’. However, they claim that children of the poor may not under-
stand that high tuition can be offset with grants and hence might not aspire to a uni-
versity education during the middle and secondary years, when the absence of such
aspiration may effectively preclude the option of any higher education. It is also al-
leged that children of working class or peasant backgrounds resist borrowing, less
from personal economic calculations than from a cultural aversion to debt. Finally,
while a policy of high tuition combined with generous means-tested aid might be
more efficient, in the sense that the available public subsidies can be more effec-
tively targeted, the high tuition can be imposed by short-term political expediency,
while the high aid requires a longer-term ideological commitment – and the result
can easily be a de facto policy of ‘high tuition-low aid’ or ‘high tuition-high loans on-
ly’ [Johnstone 1993a]. 
Resistance to the shift of costs from governments and taxpayers to students
and parents may be based on recognition that scarce taxpayer dollars are allocated
by political authorities not necessarily on a rational assessment of the costs and ben-
efits of all competing claims, but on the basis of which claims can muster the great-
est political pressure. To critical or neo-Marxist opponents of neoliberalism, both the
market and the liberal democratic politics prevailing in most of the West mainly
perpetuate the existing unequal distribution of power, status, wealth and economic
opportunities. A major plank in the critical opposition to higher educational cost
sharing and marketisation is the assertion that, contrary to the prevailing neoliber-
al position, taxes can be raised, both substantially and progressively, if there is but
the political will and leadership. Doing so, they assert, would obviate the need for
tuition and other forms of cost sharing, and would also avoid the danger of losing
enrolments (particularly among the poor) and risking failure in possibly ineffective
and expensive financial aid and loan schemes [Colclough and Manor 1991; Buchert
and King 1995].
In keeping with this strictly strategic resistance to cost sharing, even otherwise
staunch neoliberals may worry that increases in tuition may lead neither to more re-
sources for the university, nor to additional need-based aid and greater participation
among the hitherto by-passed, nor even to a shift in public resources to other so-
cially worthwhile programmes, but simply to a shift of taxpayer resources from
higher education to some other claims that may be more politically forceful, includ-
ing tax cuts for the wealthy. Thus, it is not necessarily irrational nor irresponsible
for stakeholders (even if they are strong believers in most of the typical neoliberal
agenda) to advocate for one particular object of public expenditure – say, high sub-
sidies and low or no tuition for higher education – to the exclusion of other public
purposes (or tax cuts), which can be assumed to have their own fierce advocates.
D. Bruce Johnstone: Cost Sharing in Higher Education: Tuition, Financial Assistance, and Accessibility
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However, if the political authorities do not or cannot provide sufficient public
revenue to higher education in spite of advocacy for additional tax funds and resis-
tance to tuition (and this is the essential plank of the prevailing neoliberal, cost-
sharing advocacy typified by the World Bank), the continuing austerity at some
point will become sufficiently damaging – to the point of severe enrolment limita-
tions and increasingly inadequate numbers and/or quality of faculty, books, equip-
ment, and physical plant – that more and more parents, students, university rectors,
and faculty will accept the inevitability, and even perhaps the desirability, of cost
sharing through tuition and other means. 
Cost sharing in higher education
For the reasons cited above, some increased costs borne by parents and students are
probably both inevitable and economically rational. The tenets of neoliberal eco-
nomics seemed to be ascendant in most countries at the close of the twentieth cen-
tury, including China and much of Eastern and Central Europe, as well as the high-
ly industrialised countries of the West. In the US, UK, and Germany, the embrace
of market solutions, privatisation, and fiscal discipline – long the hallmarks of con-
servative parties – have become central to the political planks of what traditionally
had been the parties of the left, particularly when these parties took over their gov-
ernments in the 1990s. Although public higher education in the US is the province
of several states, the 1980s and 1990s saw very great increases in public sector
tuition in most states. In 1997, Britain, under a Labour government, broke sharply
with the European tradition of free higher education. Germany, at the turn of the
century, once again under a Social Democratic government, conspicuously failed in
1999 to reiterate the traditional Higher Education Framework Law guarantee of free
higher education to all successful graduates of German academic secondary
schools. And in 2001, Austria became the first German-speaking country to adopt
tuition.
The supplementation of higher educational revenues by non-governmental
sources – primarily students and family – is one of the major recommendations from
the World Bank and most other development experts as one important solution to in-
creasingly underfunded and overcrowded universities in the developing world
[Johnstone 1991, 1993b; Woodhall 1992; World Bank 1994; Ziderman and Albrecht
1995; Johnstone, Arora, and Experton 1998]. We can see the beginnings of tuition
and various kinds of fees in such countries as China, Vietnam, India, and more and
more countries in Latin America and Africa. We see the dilemma of Russia, Eastern
Europe, and the other countries of the former Soviet Union, all struggling with the
need for tuition to supplement increasingly inadequate public revenues for higher
education, looking for loopholes in their present constitutional guarantees of free
higher education [Bain 1997]. We see a mature, even if uneven, private higher edu-
cation sector, mainly tuition-supported, in Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Chile,
Brazil, and elsewhere in Latin America, and private higher education sectors emerg-
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ing in the countries of the former Soviet Union and the rest of Eastern Europe. Re-
presentative public sector tuitions in a number of countries are shown in Table 1.
In the face of the increasing expenses borne by students and parents, nation-
al systems and individual institutions face the challenge of maintaining higher edu-
cational accessibility, especially for poor, minority, rural, and other traditionally un-
der-served populations. (This challenge is particularly compelling in light of the in-
creasing income disparities being experienced in most of the countries of the
world.) In the US and many other countries, the principle of expanding higher edu-
cational opportunity and accessibility is being met, among other ways, with means-
tested student financial assistance and/or with governmentally guaranteed and gen-
erally available student loans (or other forms of delayed payment, such as graduate
taxes).
What is most problematic about this shift, at least in the developing world and
in the nations of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, is that many of these
countries may lack (in addition to a sufficiently affluent middle class that can afford
tuition) such beliefs and traditions as: 
– A belief in the very appropriateness of tuition: that is, that parents and/or stu-
dents should contribute to the instructional costs of higher education, at least to the
limit of their abilities, even in the acknowledged ‘public’ institutions. (Families in
many European countries expect to pay for their children’s living costs, although not
the instructional costs, or tuition – which is why the ability to attend university and
live at home is important, and why higher education is so much more accessible in
urban areas. Families in Scandinavia expect their high taxes to assure free higher ed-
D. Bruce Johnstone: Cost Sharing in Higher Education: Tuition, Financial Assistance, and Accessibility
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Table 1. Representative College / University Public Sector Tuition 
(First Degree, Most Recent Available Academic Year, US Dollars)
ucation, but expect their children – as young independent adults – to bear the costs
of living through ubiquitous, subsidised loans.)
– The tradition of revealing incomes and assets, honestly, in response to tax laws or
requests for the documentation of financial need for the obtaining of student assis-
tance. (The difficulty of income verification is becoming more of a problem in de-
veloping and ‘transitional’ economies with the spread of private employment, partic-
ularly among the middle and professional classes, where employment has tradi-
tionally been mainly governmental, and incomes easy to track.)
– The tradition of philanthropic giving to higher education, which can build up
scholarship funds at colleges and universities, public as well as private. (Some cul-
tures have strong traditions of charity, or of giving to religion, but not necessarily to
higher education, which is considered either a private good, appropriately afford-
able to the elite, or the responsibility of the government.)
It is because of these traditions (together with the nearly $56 billion dollars in
student aid and loans, most of it ‘need-sensitive’) that the US, in the face of the very
high costs of higher education, both public and private, can still hold to the claim
that access to higher education, up to the limits of a student’s ability and interest,
need not be precluded by family financial status. Elsewhere, in the absence of these
traditions, and of public policies to maintain accessibility, there is reason to believe
that higher education will become increasingly unattainable to all but the affluent. 
But policies such as means-tested financial aid and generally available student
loans at moderate interest rates are financially, politically, technically, and some-
times culturally difficult. For example, ‘financial need’ is exceedingly difficult to as-
certain and verify, especially in non-Western countries, where private sector in-
comes may be neither reported nor even recorded (or certainly under-reported) and
where tax evasion is everywhere prevalent [McMahon 1988]. Whatever parental fi-
nancial responsibility may exist may be limited to sons, or may be handled by ex-
tended families. Sections of the population may subsist on largely non-monetary in-
come, making ‘financial need’ even more difficult to assess. Yet without some way
of assessing ‘need’, either very large segments of the population must effectively be
denied access to higher education, or tuition must be kept at zero or low for all stu-
dents – which, in the absence of alternative public revenue, would mean that the
colleges and universities would either have to limit enrolments (and continue to
serve only a small elite), or maintain them at such levels of overcrowding and shab-
biness so that all students may be denied a decent higher education.
What is the right tuition?
In response to recognition of the need for, and even the inevitably of, greater cost
sharing – which frequently is merely a euphemism for the introduction of or sharp
increase in tuition – ministries and higher educational leaders frequently inquire:
‘What is the proper level of tuition?’ They are generally looking for either a mone-
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tary amount or a percentage of instructional costs that would be ‘appropriate’ or at
least in some kind of international higher educational mainstream.
But the question of ‘a proper tuition’ cannot be given any kind of useful an-
swer apart from a context of other policies and contextual circumstances. The prin-
cipal ones are the following.
1. The existence of other kinds of non-discretionary ‘fees’ in addition to tuition.
These ‘other-than-tuition’ fees may be so-called ‘up front’ or ‘one time’ fees, or oth-
er mandatory fees for e.g. application, registration, student programmes, athletics
and recreation, technology, etc. The state of California was notorious for maintain-
ing very low tuition only because of the very high fees. Japanese universities charge
‘application fees’ as high as $350, which for the major private universities can pro-
vide in excess of $15 million in operating revenue with almost no offsetting cost.
Indian universities are known for their myriad of small fees.
2. The per-student costs of the particular higher educational institution or programme
in question. Costs vary substantially across institutions and sectors, and especially
across programmes. If cost sharing – generally meaning the charging of tuition – is
established by policy as some percentage of per – student instructional expendi-
tures, then it matters greatly in making international comparisons how these per-
student costs, or institutional expenditures, are calculated. But these costs depend
on assumptions or accounting conventions: for example, how so-called indirect
costs, or institution-wide expenditures, are apportioned among first-degree or grad-
uate instruction, or how pension costs, or the costs of health insurance, or the costs
of capital are handled. In addition, per-student costs vary considerably among de-
gree programmes in accordance with prevailing faculty-student ratios, equipment
needs, and other programme-specific costs – as, for example, among programmes in
science, history, or undergraduate teacher education. 
3. The private benefits believed to be attached to certain institutions or certain degree
programmes. Regardless of the underlying instructional cost differences, it is com-
monly thought appropriate (or perhaps merely expedient, or just more feasible) to
recover a higher percentage of these costs from those programmes and degrees be-
lieved to bring the greatest private return to the student (or parents) – either in fu-
ture earning capacity, or in prestige, job security, or anything else valued in a pro-
fession or vocation. Thus in the world of private higher education, and in public
higher education where tuition is permitted, tuition and associated fees for medical
and other advanced health professional programmes are generally high, reflecting
not only the greater instructional costs of such education, but the high market val-
ue of the degree (in turn reflecting the high income and high status associated with
these professions). Also, as much of the world that was formerly dominated by
Socialist/Marxist central economic planning has given way to private enterprise and
market forces, the demand for higher education in economics, management, law,
computer and information science, and the English language has risen greatly – and
so, too, has the tuition in such programmes. 
The establishment of a ‘proper tuition’ is made even more complicated by the
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interaction and the inter-country variations between the two factors of (1) instruc-
tional costs and (2) the mix of public and private benefits. For example, it is con-
ventionally thought that research, or ‘classical’, universities are more costly per-stu-
dent than shorter-cycle, more vocationally-oriented, less research-intensive institu-
tions, so that a common percentage of costs to be charged to students and their par-
ents will generally yield a higher tuition in the classical, research university.
However, although the presumably higher unit costs of the classical university may
be true for medicine, it is probably not true for other programmes, such as law or
business, which frequently have higher tuition, but which can be rather inexpen-
sively delivered, at least at the first-degree level. 
Higher tuition in the classical university is also reinforced by the notion that
there is generally greater prestige – and thus greater private benefits and future in-
come prospects – attached to a degree from a classical university (France, with its
grandes écoles, being the conspicuous exception). In addition, the university student
is more apt to be from a wealthier family, and thus likely to be both willing and able
to pay a higher tuition. And if the student is not from a wealthy family, the greater
private benefits and income prospects of the student should still be sufficient – in
the economically rational world – to support student loans, and thus the payment
of the higher tuition.
However, except for medical and related degrees, which continue to be asso-
ciated with classical universities, most of the programmes that are coming under
greatest demand in much of the world – economics, management, computer and in-
formation science, law, and the study of the English language – can be taught and
learned just as (or more) easily in a non-university context. In fact, it can be argued
that it is more likely to be the university student – more than the student at a short
cycle non-university institution – who will more likely bring substantial public, as
opposed to mainly private, benefits. Under this construction, it would be the classi-
cal university that needed (or deserved) greater public subsidy (and lower tuition)
more than the non-university institution, which is more apt to be creating predom-
inantly private benefits.
4. The costs of student living (especially room and board). These expenses are in
large part a function of the degree to which it is possible to live at home – which, in
turn, is a matter of the proximity of the college or university to the home, the avail-
ability of inexpensive transportation, and to some degree the ‘culture’ of the ac-
ceptability or non-acceptability of living with one’s parents well into one’s twenties.
State policies in America, for example, generally aim at putting at least a communi-
ty college within the commuting range of nearly every family (which in the US gen-
erally assumes automobile ownership). Clearly, this is not possible in the rural parts
of most countries, where traditional college-going must assume living ‘in residence’.
But even where living with parents is possible, the general cultural acceptability
may vary among countries, with such an arrangement allegedly being more accept-
able, for example, in France than in England or Germany.
If the student cannot live at home, the cost of student living is most affected
by the degree to which residence halls and/or canteens are publicly subsidised or
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Table 2. Total Higher Education Costs Borne by Students and Parents
(Various Countries, Academic Year 1999–2000, US Dollars)
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Source: Compiled by the Higher Education Finance and Accessibility Project, SUNY Buffalo Center for
Comparative and Global Studies in Education. http://www.gse.buffalo.edu/org/IntHigherEdFinance
1 2000–2001 charges for the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS), which can be paid upfront with a 25%
discount, or deferred and paid after graduation on an income contingent basis at zero real interest – i.e. linked to the
prevailing rate of inflation – with the first payment due only after the borrower's annual income reaches a threshold
level (A$22,346 year in summer 2001). Each income range has a repayment rate which increases with the borrower's
salary. For fee-paying students, a BA program in 2001 was A$11,025.
2 Band 3 courses including law, medicine, dentistry etc.
3 From 1988–97, China had a 'dual track' tuition system. In 1997, all students began to be charged tuition
4 Universities and state grandes ecoles estimate of fees only. 
5 Academic year 1998–99. Tuition at the national universities is determined by the Education Ministry and is uniform
throughout the country.
6 Academic year 2000–2001.
7 The National Autonomous University of Mexico became famous for its students having forced the government to re-
scind an attempt to raise tuition from the equivalent of about $.07 to about $70.00; however, elsewhere in Mexico,
most public universities charge a modest tuition.
8 Russia continues to guarantee free higher education to students admitted to the limited number of 'government
places' on the basis of competitive exams; all others, since 1992, can be charged tuition. Nearly 50 percent of students
by 2002 were tuition-paying, contributing more than one-fourth of university revenue.
9 Scotland replaced the 'upfront' UK tuition with a mandatory contribution after graduation of L500 to the Scottish
University Endowment Fund, repayable by an income contingent loan, the present value of which is about $727.
10 The UK first imposed a uniform means-tested tuition in 1997 and has since replaced its once generous maintenance
grants with loans.
11 2000–2001 estimates.
6 This observation was confirmed by conversations the author had with parents waiting out-
side the higher education entrance examination sites in Wuhan and Chongqiung in the sum-
mer of 1999, with Professor Shen Hong of Huazhong University. 
otherwise made accessible at minimum cost. The tradition of institutionally provid-
ed residence halls is a legacy of the British collegiate model of higher education, re-
inforced in those countries where university attendance was assumed to be proper-
ly free of any student or family-financial responsibility. But these residence halls can
be spartan and crowded, as in China, where very low charges might even cover the
very minimal real costs – or quite opulent, as in many US college and university dor-
mitories, with air conditioning, private bedrooms, and extensive ‘common spaces’,
in addition to the absence of any governmental subsidy, all of which can make liv-
ing in a university dormitory in an urban area frequently more expensive than in sur-
rounding low-cost, unsubsidised private housing. Table 2 shows the total combined
expenses borne by students and parents for selected countries.
5. Parental willingness to pay. The willingness to make financial contributions
(even sacrifices) to support the children’s higher education may be a function of cul-
ture as well as affluence. This is not intended to ascribe special nobility to those cul-
tures where parents typically make large sacrifices on behalf of their children’s
higher education. But the Swedish parent, for example, has become accustomed to
paying very heavy taxes, but then enjoying the benefit of ‘free’ university education
for their children, as well as the Scandinavian convention of students paying for
their living costs through subsidised student loans; the imposition of tuition charges
in Sweden could well be resisted, even by parents who by most measures could well
afford the tuition. In contrast, the Chinese parent, who probably has only one child
to begin with, and who has probably always placed a very high value on education
(or else the child would not likely be in a position even to contemplate higher edu-
cation), is apparently willing to make considerable personal financial sacrifices for
their child to go to a university.6
Parents may be thought to be more willing to pay in countries with substan-
tial private education, where people are more used to paying for the higher (and
sometimes the secondary) education of their children. This seems to be the case in
the US, where tuition at private colleges and universities may be in excess of
$20,000 a year, and total expenses well in excess of $30,000, and where undergrad-
uate residential tuition in the more expensive public universities can now be
$4–5000 or more (having been rising more steeply than those in the private sector),
and where total expenses in the public sector can easily reach $15,000 a year.
However, the expected correlation of public and private sector tuition does not hold
in international comparative analysis. Japan, Brazil, India, Korea, the Philippines,
and other countries with established private higher education sectors still feature
low or no-cost public classical universities. Furthermore, efforts to increase tuition
in the public sector – even modestly, and even in light of the pronounced middle
and upper income profiles of these advantaged student bodies – seem still to be met
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with intense political opposition (as in the total shut down of the National
Autonomous University of Mexico for most of 1999 over a government proposal to
raise tuition from a few cents to approximately $70 per semester). 
In America, parents have always faced a quite precisely calculated ‘expected
family contribution’ (EFC). But a realistic expected family contribution cannot be de-
rived simply from some ex ante rule of what parents at various income levels ought
to pay, but from what they seem in fact willing to pay at a particular time in a par-
ticular culture. The EFC in the US has actually diminished in recent years. Some
would say that this diminution reflects a growing middle class hedonism; others
would say that the US Congress has pandered to middle and upper middle class tu-
ition anxiety by legislatively excluding most of the EFC that used to stem from
parental assets, principally home equity. The US case is further complicated by the
large number of students from single parent homes where ‘parental financial re-
sponsibility’ is difficult to determine or enforce. Also, there are very many students
in America who are both financially needy and academically marginal and other-
wise ambivalent about higher education, but who have places in the open admission
sectors of American higher education. Such students may say that they would de-
cline to enrol or would drop out in the event of a large tuition increase. Or, they may
attribute their dropping out to ‘financial factors’, but this may also be the most so-
cially acceptable reason to profess – more so, for example, than factors like acade-
mic difficulty, boredom, loss of interest, or their parents’ unwillingness to pay what
other similarly-situated parents might pay willingly. In short, parental willingness to
pay, like student willingness to incur indebtedness, is probably substantially cul-
turally determined, and may further differ by social class or family income – but
with the true effect of the strictly financial factors associated with cost sharing be-
ing embedded within other factors and difficult to identify precisely. 
6. Possibilities for student summertime and term-time employment. Working one’s
way through college is part of the American myth – and is still substantially true
[Stern and Nakata, 1991]. The US student who claims ‘financial need’ is expected to
earn and save at least $1500 during the summers. He or she is also expected to hold
down a part-time job, generally about 10 hours a week, for approximately $2000.
However, many American students hold jobs requiring from 20 to 40 hours a week
– all the while supposedly enrolled as ‘full time’ (although in fact frequently tak-
ing more than the standard four years to complete a degree). But the ability of stu-
dent summer and term-time employment to contribute substantially toward cost
sharing is a function of at least four factors that may be especially prevalent in the
US: (1) a culture of acceptance – even expectation – of part-time youth employment,
even among affluent families where such employment is not essential to the fami-
ly’s financial well being; (2) a generally robust economy with an abundance of part-
time, unskilled, low-paying but readily available jobs; (3) the encouragement and fi-
nancial assistance of the Federal Work-Study Program, which partially subsidises
college and some community jobs for needy students; and (4) collegiate standards
(low compared to most countries) and an academic calendar (including extensive
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evening classes) that allows and even encourages part-time study and ‘stopping
out’. Taken together, these economic, cultural, and structural features combine to al-
low substantial cost sharing by the student from part-time and summer employ-
ment. However, these features may be largely absent in many countries, and seem
to be especially absent in those countries that are experiencing the greatest need to
supplement governmental revenue. But the non-availability of student employment
then puts more pressure on grants and loans – to which we next turn.
7. The general availability and sufficiency of ‘need-based’ or ‘means-tested’ grants
and subsidised loans. In theory, a ‘need-based’ grant, increasingly in conjunction with
a student loan, substitutes for the missing parental contribution from the low-in-
come family. By ‘generally available’, we mean that a student otherwise interested
in and admissible to higher or post-secondary education would be entitled to a grant
or subsidised loan because of his or her family’s low income, or similarly would not
be precluded from borrowing by the absence of family collateral or creditworthy
parents. Grants and loans not generally available are by definition rationed, usually
by criteria of academic merit or preparedness, having nothing to do with the ability
of the family to provide financial support. The US Pell grants, the former British
mandatory grants, the French bourse sociale, and the German BAföG, are examples
of governmentally-provided student financial assistance to which a student is enti-
tled simply by being accepted to a university, being from a low income family, and
generally maintaining some minimum academic standard or progress toward the
degree. Because academic merit or preparedness, at least as conventionally mea-
sured, is strongly correlated with socio-economic status, the more ‘merit’ figures in-
to the awarding of grants and subsidised loans – much of which (to the upper-mid-
dle class) is likely to have little or no impact on the student’s enrolment decision –
the less there is likely to be available for low-income students, and the more the im-
position of tuition is thus likely to be a barrier to higher educational participation.
‘Sufficiency’ refers to the ability of the need-based grant or loan subsidies to
truly compensate for the low income of the family. ‘Sufficiency’ is a function of the
maximum grant or loan subsidy (i.e. the amount to which the children of the low-
est income families would be entitled) and the degree to which that amount can tru-
ly compensate for the unavailability of parental contributions. In its most generous
formulation, a grant-loan combination is ‘sufficient’ to the degree to which it can
bring within financial reach of the lowest income family the best higher education
to which the student would be otherwise entitled. In its minimum formulation, a
grant-loan combination might be deemed ‘sufficient’ if it at least brought the least
expensive higher educational alternative (probably a short cycle, non-university
form) within reach of those students able to live at home and perhaps also work part
time (or even full time) and attend college only part time. 
‘Sufficiency’ is also a function of the relationship of the grant (or the grant/loan
combination) to varying family incomes. This relationship is established by the (low
income) point at which the maximum grant begins to be diminished (under the ex-
pectation that the family can now begin contributing at least something) and the rate
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Table 3. Range of College and University Costs Borne by Students and Parents (First Degree
Various Countries, Academic Year 1999–2000, national currency and US Dollars)
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Source: Information from the Higher Education Finance and Accessibility Project, SUNY Buffalo
Center for Comparative and Global Studies in Education.
http://www.gse.buffalo.edu/org/IntHigherEdFinance
1 2000–2001.
2 2001–2002.
3 Academic year 1998–99. Tuition at the national universities is determined by the
Education Ministry and is uniform throughout the country.
4 Academic year 2000–2001.
5 Academic year 1999–2000.
6 2000–2001 tuition estimates.
7 Very low tuition is sometimes equated with ‘public’ higher education, but there can in
theory be publicly-owned and privately-owned institutions with high or low tuition, depend-
ing partly on the underlying instructional costs, but mainly on the degree of public subsidis-
ation of these underlying costs. 
at which further increments to family income are effectively ‘taxed’ through higher
expected family contributions and further reductions in the need-based grant.
Obviously, the more generally available the grant (that is, the more it is based on in-
come alone, without further rationing by some measure of ‘merit’), and the more suf-
ficient the grant (that is, the more generous the grant, or the grant/loan combination,
in making possible the most costly alternative to which the student would be acade-
mically entitled), and the more realistic the expected parental contribution (in the
sense of phasing out the grant and phasing in the expected contribution at a level
and rate that most families are able to meet), the more the need-based grant-loan sys-
tem will be able to compensate for enrolment-limiting effects of tuition. 
In summary, in order to answer the question of what tuition should be – or
what the total expense burden borne by the student and family should be – a con-
sideration of all of these factors is required. One can expect to find a very consider-
able expense burden – in the range of US$ 20,000–30,000 – in the presence of very
high tuition, as in the case of a high quality private higher education with little or
no public support of basic instructional costs, and no ‘price discounts’ or grant as-
sistance, and living away from home in conditions not unlike one’s employed, non-
student-age peers. The lowest financial burdens upon students and parents may be
found in some combination of low or zero tuition7 and the opportunity to live at
home. Many countries, as shown in Table 3, have a considerable range of total
costs/expenses borne by the student and parent before financial assistance in the form
of either grants or loans.
Grants versus loans
In so far as financial assistance is to compensate for low family income and bring
higher education within reach of any student of requisite ability, regardless of his or
her family’s income, either grants (non-repayable) or loans (repayable by the stu-
dent, parent, business enterprise, or taxpayer) should suffice – providing that stu-
dents are willing to borrow, and that banks or other savings institutions are willing
to lend to them. Students would presumably always prefer that their assistance be
non-repayable – that is, in the form of grants, in addition to no or very low tuition,
subsidised room and board, and strongly subsidised loans that are really ‘near
grants’. However, in so far as the rationale for the combination of tuition, unsub-
sidised student living arrangements, and accompanying student financial assistance
is avowedly to shift costs from governments and taxpayers to students and parents,
then the more this student assistance can take the form of a ‘true’ (that is, unsub-
sidised or minimally subsidised) loan, the more effectively all of the rationales dis-
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cussed earlier can be met. That is, it is loans (or other versions of deferred payments,
like graduate taxes) more than governmentally provided grants that:
1. relieve the government, and thus the public sector generally, of some of the
burden of the high and rising costs of higher education and (at least theoretically)
provide more revenue to the university;
2. promote equity by allowing the costs of higher education to be shared be-
tween the public, reflecting the not inconsiderable public benefits of higher educa-
tion, and the family, reflecting the also considerable private benefits to both the stu-
dent and the family;
3. engage the forces of the market to enhance both the efficiency and the re-
sponsiveness of the university.
However, in order to relieve the public treasury and truly shift the cost burden
to the student and parent, the loans must be repaid – and at something at least near
the generally prevailing rate of interest. This is as true for ‘contingent repayment’ or
‘income contingent’ loans, such as those employed in Sweden and available in the
US, as for conventional ‘mortgage type’ loans [Johnstone 1972, 1986; Woodhall, 1988,
1989; Ziderman and Albrecht 1995]. It is also true of other forms of deferred payment
where the student presumably bears a share of the higher educational cost burden,
but only repays in the future, over time, and only as long as he or she is gainfully em-
ployed. Such repayment schemes include the so-called graduate tax (often advocat-
ed, but never fully implemented; see Barr, 1989), the ‘income surtax’ repayment em-
ployed in Australia through the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS), and
the ‘drawdown’ of governmental pension payments employed in Ghana to repay the
student loan fund. In all of these repayment schemes, the present discounted value
of the stream of future payments (or of income surtax payments, or of foregone pen-
sion fund contributions) must equal the original value of the loan, or of any forgiv-
en tuition, for the cost burden truly to have been shifted to the student. To the ex-
tent that loan repayments are ‘lost’ through high defaults, lost tax records, emigra-
tion or simple disappearance, subsidised interest rates, or excessively high govern-
mentally-borne costs of collection and servicing, the loan does not really shift the
costs, and can be more accurately characterised as a ‘near’ or ‘effective’ grant – and
generally a rather inefficient and politically costly one at that! 
Access and participation: cost sharing and enrolment behaviour
Countries differ in the percentage of the traditional tertiary education age cohort
that actually goes on to various forms of higher or post-secondary education. Since
there are substantially differing private benefits attached to these different forms, it
‘matters’, for example, whether students choose, are able to elect, are tracked into,
or are restricted from:
– any tertiary level education;
– only a short-cycle, minimum status, non-selective form of post-secondary education;
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– a selective, prestigious, classical university; 
– or even beyond, to the most selective and prestigious university programmes, such
as medicine or law or advanced study toward a Ph.D.
Clearly, there are fewer and fewer students at the more advanced and selective
end of this higher educational pipeline. That is, some students are somehow select-
ed or otherwise admitted into – while others are somehow screened or selected out
of – the more advanced, remunerative, and ‘selective’ levels or stages of higher ed-
ucation. The question most commonly identified with higher education’s ‘accessi-
bility’ is the degree to which this selection, ‘screening’, or ‘narrowing of the
pipeline’ is a function of factors considered in most societies and cultures to be po-
litically or ideologically acceptable or unacceptable. The principal ‘acceptable’ fac-
tors, or correlates, would be genuinely innate intelligence or talent, or interest (es-
pecially interest that is itself a function more of something innate than of environ-
ment or culture).
Factors generally considered ‘unacceptable’ – and therefore, if possible, have
their association with ‘access’ lessened by policy – would be, for example: (a) low
income or low social status of the parents; (b) region (especially being from a rural
or remote area); (c) race, religion, or ethnicity; or (d) gender (although this may be a
more culturally contested correlate).
In this construction, then, higher educational accessibility may be seen as a
policy goal, more or less common to most countries, realised to the degree to which
the principal correlates with higher educational participation – as well as to partic-
ipation within the more prestigious or selective forms or levels of higher education
– are mainly interest, ability, and talent, and conversely are not family income or sta-
tus, race or ethnicity, gender, or region or rural/urban location. 
There exists in virtually all countries a substantial underlying association be-
tween low higher educational participation and the above-mentioned unacceptable
correlates, particularly family income and status, race and ethnicity, rural or remote
location, and at least in many developing countries, gender. The true causation that
diminishes the probability of higher educational participation may be subtle and
complex, and may have done its work long before the end of secondary schooling,
when more fortunate young people and their parents are making decisions to par-
take of higher education. High income-high status families are apt to place more
emphasis early in a child’s life on education. They are likely to have more books in
the house, to take more of an interest in their children’s education, and to be able
to afford (or live where there exist) better middle and secondary schools – all in or-
der to better prepare their children for university entrance. In most countries, the
correlation between higher educational participation with family income, status,
and other ‘unacceptable correlates’8 is well established before the completion of
secondary school. Therefore, a reasonable goal for cost sharing might be to be able
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8 Daniel Levy has observed that these correlates, however ‘unacceptable’, are nonetheless vir-
tually unavoidable; thus ‘lamentable’ might be a more useful descriptor.
to pass some element of costs on to students and parents without further accentu-
ating the ‘unacceptable correlates’ to higher educational participation of high fami-
ly income, urban location, and dominant ethnicity or language. 
Accordingly, an investigation of the connection between cost sharing and ac-
cessibility must examine the effect that greater higher educational costs passed on
to students and families (probably in the form of higher tuition, or the implementa-
tion of tuition where it did not previously exist, or the reduction of student living
subsidies) have on:
– the decision to apply to and matriculate in any institution of higher education;
– the decision to apply to or matriculate in a particular form (for example, a univer-
sity or a less selective non-university) or a particular programme (for example, med-
icine, law, engineering, or humanities) in higher or post-secondary education;
– the likelihood of degree completion;
– the likelihood of going on to more advanced (and more prestigious and/or remu-
nerative) levels of higher education.
The empirical research on the effect of both tuition and need-based financial
assistance on student enrolment behaviour is mainly econometric analyses – either
cross-sectional or time series – of enrolment and persistence of US students in re-
sponse to differing state tuition policies [Leslie and Brinkman 1989; Kane 1995;
Heller 1999]. This research supports the conventional wisdom that net price – that
is, the combined effect of tuition discounted by financial aid – has little effect on
middle and upper-middle income students. However, it can have a measurably dis-
couraging impact on low-income youth, an impact that is only partly offset by in-
creasing need-based aid.
Significantly, there are factors in the US that may serve to blunt the impact of
rising tuition on enrolment behaviour, or at least diminish the likelihood that the ef-
fect will be an outright denial of accessibility.9 Among these factors are:
– the very great number of open-access two year colleges within commuting range
of most US homes, successful completion of which (even partial completion, or
passing only several courses) is generally transferable, or applicable toward a four-
year degree;
– a similar widespread availability of many virtually open-admission four-year col-
leges, both public and private;
– the peculiarly American ‘degree-by-credit-accumulation’, or ‘modular’ system that
makes possible easy ‘stopping out’ (for example, to earn and save money), or trans-
fer from an expensive residential college to a less expensive alternative within the
commuting range from home;
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9 Interestingly, the very openness and already very high participation in US higher education
may, other things being equal, actually accentuate the dampening effect of tuition increases
on higher educational participation because of the large numbers of students who are essen-
tially ambivalent about their higher education, and who may be ‘trying it out’ as long as the
debt loads or the burdens on the parents are not too great. 
– an economy with abundant part-time employment possibilities; 
– the general availability of need-based grants and student (without any test of ei-
ther student or family credit).
The effect of these factors is to cushion the impact of increasing tuition, and to
present alternatives to not matriculating at all, or to dropping out altogether, in re-
sponse to an increase in the cost to be borne by the student or family. It is in countries
where such factors do not exist – that is, where the two-year alternative is not trans-
ferable to a four-year or advanced degree, or where there are no easily accessible high-
er educational alternatives within commuting range from home, or no generally avail-
able student loans, or no practical part-time student employment opportunities – that
a sharp rise in tuition or other expenses borne by the student or parent can be as-
sumed to be more likely to preclude higher educational participation altogether. 
In the end, we know very little still about the impact on higher educational ac-
cessibility of the increasing shift of higher educational costs, worldwide, from gov-
ernments and taxpayers to student and parents. We know that the shift is happen-
ing, and we know that most governments officially espouse a concern for the main-
tenance (or probably the enhancement) of higher educational accessibility. What we
do not know, at least not yet from systematic empirical study, is the impact on uni-
versity enrolment behaviour (or higher educational participation generally) of in-
creasing cost sharing. Nor, even more importantly, do we know from empirical
study the ameliorative efficacy of the common access policies such as means tested
grants, loans, or enhanced student employment opportunities.
The worldwide trend toward some greater cost sharing – i.e. increasing tuition
and diminishing levels of public subsidies, at least to non-needy students – seems
inevitable. The inevitability does not reflect any triumph of World Bank policies, nor
of market capitalism, and would not necessarily be the preference of many thought-
ful analysts who believe in markets but who also see many problems in the in-
creasing privatisation of higher education. But there seems to be no escape from the
conclusions that: (1) higher education in the future will need vast additional re-
sources, particularly in the developing countries; and (2) the only alternative to
more of the burden being shifted to parents and students is for there to be very large
increases in taxes, progressively raised. 
Herein lie the two problems that above all undergird the likelihood of a con-
tinued shift of higher-education costs from governments and taxpayers to students
and parents. The first is that substantial increases in progressive taxes – that is, tax-
es that fall proportionately more heavily on the rich, and thus are levied mainly on
income and wealth – are exceedingly difficult to collect (mainly because they are so
easy to escape). The second problem with relying on massive tax increases (pro-
gressive or otherwise) to avoid the need for greater higher-education cost sharing is
that higher education is simply not at the front of the queue, even if taxes were to
be significantly and successfully increased. Elementary and secondary education,
public health and sanitation, environmental restoration and preservation, housing
and other public infrastructure, and a social safety net for the elderly, the unem-
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ployed and the unemployable are almost certainly ahead of higher education in
most countries. Without some additional cost sharing, it is almost certain that en-
rolments will be restricted, and/or the higher education that is available to the mass-
es and still ‘free’ will be of increasingly lower quality.
Higher education needs to continue to claim public resources – and more of
them. But it also seems incumbent on those who can influence public policy to work
toward the construction of less costly forms of higher education and also toward the
kinds of financial assistance and loan programs that can combine significant cost
recovery with protection to those whose participation in higher education is most at
risk from the inevitable need to share in the costs. 
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